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Abstract
This paper considers a simple stochastic model of international trade with three
countries. Two of the tree countries are in an economic union. Comparisons are
made between equilibrium welfare for these two countries under fixed and flexi-
ble exchange rate regimes. Within the model it is shown that flexible exchange rate
regimes generate greater welfare. However, we then consider comparisons of wel-
farewhen the two countries also engage in some international assistance in order to
share risk. Such risk-sharing is limited by enforcement constraints of cross border
assistance. It is shown that taking into account limited commitment risk-sharing
fixed exchange rates or currency areas can dominate flexible exchange rate regimes
reversing the previous result.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The present paper contributes to the theories of optimal currency areas and fiscal
federalism. In an often cited paper Mundell (1961) argues that business cycles should
be sufficiently (positively) correlated for a common currency area to be optimal. Bay-
oumi (1994) formally shows that when shocks are negatively correlated across countries
a currency union is less desirable. As a consequence, the discussion about the UK’s in-
tegration (or non-integration) into the Euro currency area has often been driven by the
fact that UK business cycles are not well correlated with continental Europe (see for ex-
ample Artis 2003). Equally the discussion of when the accession countries should join
the Euro currency area has been dominated by the debate about the congruence of the
economic cycles of the accession countries and the rest of Europe (see for example Hall
and Hondroyiannis 2006).
One aspect of monetary integration that has received relatively little attention is the
interaction of international assistance and business cycles on the optimality of currency
areas. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) identified the importance of fiscal taxes and trans-
fers for interregional assistance in theUS andDrèze (2000) argues that transfers between
European regions can be used as a means of insurance against regional income shocks.1
Asdrubali et al. (1996) for theUS and Sørensen andYosha (1998) for theOECDand the EU
have examined channels of risk-sharing. They find that there is less risk-sharing through
fiscal channels in Europe and that risk-sharing is incomplete and occursmainly through
savings. This confirms earlier results of French and Poterba (1991) and Baxter and Jer-
mann (1997) for the EU which have both shown that agents’ risk diversification is in-
sufficient suggesting that there are welfare gains if more insurance between regions can
be agreed. Further Forni and Reichlin (1999) have shown that shocks and the potential
gains to risk-sharing are large.2 Given these potential gains it is important to examine the
interaction between risk-sharing through interregional assistance and the optimality of
a currency union.
In this paper we model a situation where there are nominal wage and price rigidi-
ties. These wage and price rigidities would normally mean that there is a need for ex-
1Although interregional transfers in the EU are currently quite small (less than 1% GDP) they do increas-
ingly depend on regional income (through EU Objective 1 Funds) and increasing integration is likely to
mean that transfer play a more prominent role is smoothing interregional fluctuations.
2Asdrubali and Kim (2004) have examined the dynamics of risk-sharing channels and shown complex
interactions between various risk-smoothingmechanisms. They show however that tax and transfer mech-
anism can absorb shocks long after they hit.
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change rate flexibility to offset nominal rigidities and hence that monetary union is in-
efficient. However, if the importance of transfers between countries to offset regional
shocks is taken into account this result might be reversed.3 Wemodel transfers between
countries by assuming that they are limited by self-enforcing constraints. This is a nat-
ural assumption. Although there exist supra-national institutions such as the European
Commission there is no supra-national authority to enforce transfers across nations.4
Hence countries will onlymake such transfers if they are in their own long-term interest.
This long-term interest will be determined by the future benefits of risk sharing and by
the punishment imposed for notmaking the requisite transfer. We shall assume that this
punishment is that the country will not subsequently receive future assistance. Since the
inefficiencies caused by nominal wage and price rigidities may increase the variance of
regional incomes in currency unions, they may make it easier to enforce transfers be-
cause there is an increased punishment threat or sanction that can be applied to any
country not making a transfer when it is called upon to do so. Countries may thus prefer
a monetary union because greater transfers and insurance can be sustained. That is the
benefit of insurancemay outweigh the inefficiency cost of price rigidities. We shall show
that this is indeed possible and that there are circumstances where a monetary union
is preferred to the flexible exchange rate system.5 As our model is highly stylized the
importance of the paper is not in delineating exactly the circumstances under which a
currency union is optimal but in showing that the issue of currency integration cannot
be divorced from the issue of fiscal integration through regional risk sharing.
The paper is organized as it follows. Section 2 presents the model and studies the
equilibria under common currency area and flexible exchange rates. In Section 3 we
study an economy with negatively correlated shocks and show when transfers between
countries can be sustained andwhen amonetary unionwill deliver higher welfare than a
flexible exchange rate system. Section 4 considers extensions to the basic model. These
extensions quantitatively modify but do not qualitatively change the main results that
3It is important to distinguish the role of transfers in our model from that in standard models of fiscal
federalism where positive transfers between regions may take place mainly because of sharing of a public
good, such as security (see also Alesina et al. 1995, Persson and Tabellini 1996), rather than sharing of risk.
4The analysis would not be qualitatively different if instead we assumed that it was possible to impose
some but limited sanctions on countries that reneged on transfer obligations.
5Drèze and Gollier (1993) also show that the presence of nominal rigidities in an uncertain world can
improve welfare. In their model however, the beneficial effect of rigidities is derived by firms optimally
creating wage rigidities as amechanism to insure risk averse workers. In this paper, rigidities are exogenous
and improve the substantiality of a transfer system.
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the common currency system sustains greater levels of transfers and may therefore lead
to higher welfare for certain parameter values. Section 5 concludes.
2. BASIC MODEL
We consider a simple model of international trade with three countries r = H ,F,W
(Home, Foreign and the rest of the World). We consider that Home and Foreign have
close economic ties or are in an economic union and shall be interested in whether
Home and Foreign should operate a currency union or retain a flexible exchange rate
regime. This is the situation of the UK or accession countries and the Euro area coun-
tries or betweenCanada orMexico and theUS. In order tomake the comparisonbetween
fixed and flexible exchange rates non-trivial we shall assume that there are somemarket
imperfections in the labor and productmarkets. Followingmuch of the literature on cur-
rency areas we shall assume that labor is immobile across countries and that the labor
market is subject to nominal rigidities.6 However, we shall assume there is free trade be-
tween countries and in particular there are no transport or transactions costs to trade.7
Further we shall assume that the goods markets in the Home and Foreign countries is
monopolistically competitive with a continuum of varieties produced and price setting
by firms. In the rest of the world firms produce a homogenous good which we labelW .
There is a unitmass of consumer-workers in countryH and the samemass in coun-
try F . In countryW there is also a unit mass of consumer-workers.8 Labor is supplied
inelastically. We shall assume that goods are non-storable and that consumers consume
both domestically produced and foreign produced goods. We shall index goods by ς or
ξ and let dr s(ξ) denote the demand for good of variety ξ from consumers in country r
which is produced in country s. Similarly we let drW denote the demand for good W
in country r . Individuals in all countries have the same Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type
preference function given by
(1) V (Cr )=V
((∫ 1
0
dr r (ς)
σ−1
σ dς+
∫ 1
0
dr s(ξ)
σ−1
σ dξ
) σµ
σ−1
d1−µrW
)
,
6Our assumption of labor immobility is common. However some mobility of labor does exist and mi-
gration also acts as a risk-sharing mechanism as workers move from countries suffering bad productivity
shocks to countries experiencing the good productivity shocks.
7Transport costs can be added to themodel without substantially changing the conclusions of the paper.
Without transport costs a currency union is never desirable without the insurance motives we model here.
Thus introducing transportation costs will tend to strengthen our conclusions.
8Nothing will hinge on the relative size of countryW and the assumption of a unit mass for the rest of
the world is made purely for convenience.
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where V is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave so that agents are risk
averse,9 Cr is the aggregate composite good in country r and σ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution. The elasticity σ will be a measure of the degree of competition between
firms and the higher is σ the greater will be the degree of competition between firms
across countries. The parameter µ measures the relative importance of the rest of the
World. If µ is close to one then the rest of the World has little importance and we are left
with a two country model. If µ is small then the rest of the world is more important so
there is a smaller need of insurance between countries H and F under flexible exchange
rates. Letting pr s(ς) denote the price of good ς sold in country r and produced in country
s, the budget constraint for the representative agent in country r is
∫ 1
0
drH (ς)prH (ς)dς+
∫ 1
0
drF (ξ)prF (ξ)dξ+prW drW = Yr +Tr
where Yr is the income of consumers in country r and Tr is the transfer income received
by country r expressed in the own countries currency. As we are examining an economic
union between H and F we shall consider transfers only between the Home and Foreign
country and ignore transfers with the rest of the world, that is we set TW ≡ 0.10 With
the utility function given in (1) the demand for variety ς produced in country s from
consumers in country r is given by
(2) dr s(ς)=µpr s(ς)
−σ (Yr +Tr )
P1−σr
and where Pr is a price index for goods produced in H and F and is given by
(3) Pr =
(∫ 1
0
pr r (ς)
1−σdς+
∫ 1
0
pr s(ξ)
1−σdξ
) 1
1−σ
.
Likewise the demand for goodW in country r is
drW = (1−µ) (Yr +Tr )
prW
where prW is the price of goodW in country r .
9For some of the subsequent analysis and the numerical calculations we shall assume that the utility
function exhibits constant relative risk aversion preferences.
10If transfers could be made to or received from the rest of the world this would tend to reduce the desire
for insurance from the other country and reduce the punishment for any country reneging on its transfers
making self-enforcement more difficult. This issue could only be examined in a full three country model
with enforcement constraints for each country.
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As is well-known the composite consumption is linear in income and simple calcu-
lation shows that
(4) Cr =µµ(1−µ)1−µ Yr +Tr
Pµr p
1−µ
rW
.
It will be convenient to emphasize the dependence of the composite consumption on
the transfer and write it as a function of the transfer receivedCr (T ).
The exchange rate between currencies in the two countries H and F will depend on
whether there is a single currency area or a flexible exchange rate. However, in either
case since we have assumed there is free and frictionless trade prices satisfy
pr s = εr spss ∀r 6= s
where εr s is the exchange rate that converts currency of country s into the currency of
country r . Since trade is frictionless εr s = 1/εsr . With three countries there are effec-
tively two independent exchange rates and we shall write ε for εHF and η for εHW . Thus
εFW = ε/η. For convenience we shall also write pr (ς) for pr r (ς) and pWW = pW . There-
fore pHF (ς) = εpF (ς), pFH (ξ) = pH (ξ)/ε and pHW = ηpW . Then it is easy to check from
equation (3) that PH = εPF and that pFW = pHW /ε. Since there are no transfer from
outside H and F we shall have TH =−εTF . In the case of a common currency area ε= 1.
We now consider firm behavior. We shall let Y = YH +εYF +ηYW denote total world
income measured in the home currency.11 For firms producing variety ς in country H
the demand they face fromHome and other consumers is
dH (ς)= dHH (ς)+dFH (ς)+dWH (ς)
=µ
pH (ς)−σ (YH +TH )
P1−σH
+
(
pF (ς)
ε
)−σ
(YF +TF )
P1−σF
+
(
pW
η
)−σ
YW
P1−σW

=µpH (ς)
−σ
P1−σH
Y
(5)
where the second equality follows because PH = εPF and TH =−εTF . Similarly
(6) dF (ξ)=µpH (ς)
−σ
P1−σH
Y
ε
and dR = (1−µ) 1
pW
Y
η
.
11Note that because of our specification of preferences transfers do not affect world demand.
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Firms take demands as given and costs are determined by labor requirements. La-
bor requirement are given by a fixed coefficient technology where to produce one unit
of output in country r requires ar units of labor. The price of labor is denoted by wr .
However, we shall assume that the labormarket is imperfect and that nominal wages are
fixed and therefore normalize wr = 1.12 With flexible exchange rates the exchange rates
will adjust to achieve full employment in each country. However, if there is a common
currency between countries H and F , the nominal rigidity in wages will cause unem-
ployment in the relatively unproductive country. In Section 3 we shall assume that aH
and aF are stochastic and specify a simple stochastic process. However, because input
decisions will be made once ar is known and since there are no intertemporal linkages
in production or consumption we can determine equilibria as if ar were fixed and given.
In countryW , aW = 1 and we assume that firms are perfectly competitive. Thus we nor-
malize so that pW = 1 which in turn implies pHW = η and PFW = η/ε. In countries H
and F firms are assumed to be monopolistically competitive and will set prices to max-
imize profits given wage costs. Given the fixed coefficients and the iso-elastic demand
functions given in equation (2), prices are set at a mark-up over cost
(7) pr (ς)= σ
σ−1ar , r ∈ {H ,F }.
It follows from equation (7) that all firms in countries H and F set the same price which
is simply a mark-up over costs. This mark-up depends on the elasticity of substitution
between commodities and when substitution is perfect (σ=∞) there is perfect compe-
tition and price equal marginal cost. Equally it follows from equation (7) that demand
is the same for all varieties dr (ς) = dr in a given country. Thus total labor demand is
simply `r = ardr . By assumption all profits accrue to firms owners and for convenience
we assume that all profits are spent locally. Thus the national income in country r is
Yr = prdr = pr`r /ar . From equation (7) we may therefore write this national income as
(8) YH = σ
σ−1`H and YF =
σ
σ−1`F .
Also since pW = 1, `W = 1 and aW = 1, national income inW is YW = 1. Equally the price
index of equation (3) can be re-written using equation (7) as
PH =
(
p1−σH +ε1−σp1−σF
) 1
1−σ = σ
σ−1
(
a1−σH +ε1−σa1−σF
) 1
1−σ = εPF .
12Assuming that nominal wages are completely inflexible is obviously an extreme assumption which we
make for convenience only. As argued byMundell (1961) this a priori makes a currency union less desirable.
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An equilibrium is then a set of prices and demands such that (i) consumers maxi-
mize their utility given their budget constraint and given prices, (ii) firms set their profit
maximizing prices and (iii) product markets clear. Since the labor market is imperfect in
countriesH and F we do not assume that the labormarket clears and theremay be some
situations, discussed below, where labor markets do not clear. In either case the product
demand dr (ς) equals product supply `r /ar so that from equations (5) and (6) we have
(9) µ
pH (ς)−σY
P1−σH
= `H
aH
and µ
pF (ς)−σ
(Y
ε
)
P1−σF
= `F
aF
for each variety ς. In addition we have the equivalent condition for the rest of the world
so that (1−µ)(Y /η)= 1. Using the fact that PH = εPF and pH/pF = aH/aF and taking the
ratio of the two equations in (9) gives
(10) ε=
(
aH
aF
) σ−1
σ
(
`H
`F
) 1
σ
and η= σ(1−µ)
(σ−1)µ (`H +ε`F ) .
These conditions will determine either the exchange rates ε and η or if ε is fixed the first
condition determines level of employment in either country H or F .
2.1. Common currency area
We now consider the equilibrium in which countries H and F form a common cur-
rency area so that ε= 1. In this case the price index is the same in both countries,PH = PF
and we let P denote this common index. Then
P = (p1−σH +p1−σF ) 11−σ = σσ−1 (a1−σH +a1−σF ) 11−σ .
There are two cases to consider depending on the sign of aH −aF . If aH < aF the Home
country is relatively more productive and requires less labor to produce any given quan-
tity of output. With this parametrization and fixedwages it is easy to check that a share of
country F ’s labor force will be unemployed, `F < 1, as its costs will be higher and hence
demand will fall. In contrast there will be full employment, `H = 1, in country H . It then
follows from equation (10) that `F = (aH/aF )σ−1 < 1. If on the other hand aH > aF then
there will be unemployment in the Home country and `H = (aH/aF )1−σ < 1= `F . Using
equation (4) and the price index P given by equation (2.1), the composite consumption
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in each of the two countries is given by
C cH (T )=µ
(
`H +
(
σ−1
σ
)
T
)
(`H +`F )
(
a1−σH +a1−σF
) µ
σ−1
C cF (T )=µ
(
`F +
(
σ−1
σ
)
T
)
(`H +`F )C cH (T )
where the superscript c denotes that the consumption is under a currency union. Hence
the level of employment in the two countries is given by
`H =min
{(
aH
aF
)1−σ
,1
}
and `F =min
{(
aH
aF
)σ−1
,1
}
.
2.2. Flexible exchange rate system
We now consider equilibrium output and consumption under a flexible exchange
rate system. The introduction of an exchange rate provides an additional instrument
to allow relative prices to alter and production and employment to increase. Although
nominal wages are fixed at wH = wF = 1 the exchange rate allows the relative wages
εwF /wH to adapt. Under a flexible exchange rate system there is no real wage rigidity so
that labor market clears in the both the high and low productivity countries and hence
`H = `F = 1. Then equilibrium output in both H and F is YH = YF = σ/(σ−1) and the
exchange rates are determined from (10):
(11) ε=
(
aH
aF
) σ−1
σ
and η= σ(1−µ)
(σ−1)µ (1+ε).
If aH < aF then country F has relatively low productivity and its currency depreciates
making its exports relatively cheaper to the Home country. Likewise if aH > aF then
country F is relativelymore productive and its currencywill appreciate so that its exports
become relatively more expensive to the Home country. With this exchange rate adjust-
ment and remembering that PH = εPF , the composite consumption in each country is
given by from equation (4) as
C fH (T )=µ
(
1+
(
σ−1
σ
)
T
)
(1+ε)µ−1 (a1−σH +ε1−σa1−σF ) µσ−1
C fF (T )= εC
f
H (T )
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where the superscript f indicates that the consumption is calculated under flexible ex-
change rates and where the exchange rate ε is as given in equation (11).
In the absence of transfers, an appropriate exchange rate policy (common currency
or flexible exchange rate) also allows countries to achieve the highest aggregate con-
sumption. One readily shows thatC fr (0)≥C cr (0) for r =H ,F . Thus we have the standard
result
PROPOSITION 1: In the absence of any transfers (Tr = 0), aggregate consumption at
any state is higher under flexible exchange rate system: C fr (0)≥C cr (0), r =H ,F .
PROOF: Take the case aH < aF . We have
C fH (0)=µ
(
a1−σH +ε1−σa1−σF
) µ
σ−1 (1+ε)µ−1
C cH (0)=µ
(
a1−σH +a1−σF
) µ
σ−1
(
1+
(
aH
aF
)σ−1)µ−1
.
Since aH < aF , ε1−σ > 1 and ε> (aH/aF )σ−1. HenceC fH (0)>C cH (0). Also
C fH (0)= εC
f
H (0)
C cH (0)=
(
aH
aF
)σ−1
C cH (0).
Since ε > (aH/aF )σ−1 this shows that C fF (0) > C cF (0). A similar argument applies in the
case where aH > aF . 2
Thus in this model if there are no transfers between countries H and F then a com-
mon currency area will always be dominated by a flexible exchange rate regime.
3. CURRENCY AREAS UNDER NEGATIVELY CORRELATED SHOCKS
We shall now consider transfers between countries H and F and how this affects
the result that a flexible exchange rate regime dominates a common currency area that
we have seen in Proposition 1. To do this we will need to specify a stochastic process
for productivity shocks so that there are some potential mutual gains to transfers. The
role of shocks has often played a key role in debates about common currency areas. Tak-
ing into account transactions costsMundell (1961) argues that business cycles should be
sufficiently (positively) correlated for a common currency area to be optimal. Bayoumi
(1994) formally shows that negative correlation of shocksmakes currency unions less de-
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sirable. As a consequence, the discussion about the UK’s integration or non-integration
in the Euro currency area has often been driven by the fact that UK business cycles are
not well correlated with continental Europe.
In this section we shall show that the conclusion of Mundell (1961) can be reversed
when self-enforcing transfers are taken into account. That is we shall show that a com-
mon currency area can be optimal when shocks are negatively correlated. To do this we
take the extreme assumption that shocks are perfectly negatively correlated. Thus we
will make assumptions, absence of transactions costs and negatively correlated shocks,
that are usually seen as inimical to currency unions, yet show that a common currency
area can be optimal in these circumstances.13 Our argument lies in the fact that when
there are productivity shocks and income variability across countries it will be desir-
able to try and smooth these shocks by making transfers between countries. However,
transfers across countries may be difficult to legally enforce and therefore such insur-
ance transfers must be self-enforcing and enforcementmay sometimes be helped by the
threat of a more severe punishment.
To proceed we shall assume that the technology in countries H and F is stochastic.
We shall assume there are just two symmetric states, so that the two countries either have
a good or a bad productivity shock. Further we suppose that these states are perfectly
negatively correlated states so that the labor requirements are (aH ,aF ) = (z,1) in state
1 and (aH ,aF ) = (1,z) in state 2. We assume that z < 1 so that the Home country has
a good productivity shock is state 1 and the Foreign country has the good productivity
shock in state 2. To preserve symmetry we assume that each state occurs with equal
probability. With these assumptions, the aggregate composite consumption under the
common currency in the two states is given by
C cG (T )=µ
(
1+
(
σ−1
σ
)
T
)
z(µ−1)(σ−1)
(
1+ z1−σ) σ(µ−1)+1σ−1
C cB (T )=µ
(
zσ−1+
(
σ−1
σ
)
T
)
z(µ−1)(σ−1)
(
1+ z1−σ) σ(µ−1)+1σ−1
where C cG (T ) is the consumption of the Home (Foreign) country in state 1 (2) when it
experiences a good productivity shock andC cB (T ) is the consumption of the Home (For-
13The empirical evidence (see for example Artis 2003, Hall and Hondroyiannis 2006) suggests that the
correlations of the UK and the CEECs with the rest of the EU is relatively weak. Our assumption of neg-
ative correlation is made to keep the analysis simple and to take the case usually thought to be the most
unfavorable to the optimality of currency areas.
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eign) country in state 2 (1) when it experiences a bad productivity shock. The transfer
T is the amount received and expressed in the countries own currency. Since zσ−1 < 1 it
can be seen that absent any transfers the Home (Foreign) country has higher consump-
tion in state 1 (2), when it experiences a positive productivity shock.
Under the flexible exchange rate regime the exchange rate in state 1 is ε1 = z σ−1σ < 1
as the Foreign currency depreciates when the Home country has a positive productivity
shock. In contrast, in state 2 when the Foreign country has a positive productivity shock
its exchange rate appreciates to ε2 = z 1−σσ > 1. Then calculating the aggregate composite
consumption in each state for the two countries gives:
C fG (T )=µ
(
1+
(
σ−1
σ
)
T
)
z
1−σ
σ
(
1+ z 1−σσ
) σ(µ−1)+1
σ−1
C fB (T )= z
σ−1
σ C fG (T ).
As z
σ−1
σ < 1 it can be seen that absent any transfers the Home (Foreign) country has
higher consumption in state 1 (2)when it has positive productivity shock than in state 2 (1),
so thatC fG (0)>C
f
B (0).
3.1. First-best transfers
In this section we determine the first-best transfers and show that if the first-best
transfers are implemented, then the flexible exchange rate regime yields greater welfare.
The first-best transfers will equalize composite consumptions whether countries have
good or bad productivity shocks. Let τi∗ denote the transfer received by the country with
the bad productivity shock under regime i ∈ {c, f }. This will be the transfer received by
the Home (Foreign) country in state 2 (1).
With a common currency the transfer received by the country with the bad produc-
tivity shock equals the transfer made by the country with the good productivity shock.
Thus the first-best transfer can be found by solving C cG (−τ) = C cB (τ). Calculating this
transfer and the first-best composite consumptionC c∗ gives
τc∗ =
1
2
σ
σ−1
(
1− zσ−1) and C c∗ = 12µzµ(σ−1) (1+ z1−σ) µσσ−1 .
It can be seen that since zσ−1 < 1, the transfer τc∗ is positive and decreasing in z. It can
also be seen that in this simple model transfers are independent of the rest of the World
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for two reasons. First, the transfer has no effect on world income Y and secondly it does
not depend on µ the degree of preference for rest of the World goods.
Under flexible exchange rates if τ f∗ is received by the country with the bad produc-
tivity shock then the transfer made by the country with the good productivity shock is
z
σ−1
σ τ
f
∗. In state 1 (2) it is the Home (Foreign) country which has the good productivity
shock so the transfer made is ε1τ
f
∗ (τ
f
∗/ε2) where ε1 = z
σ−1
σ = 1/ε2. The first-best transfer
is therefore found by solvingC fG (−z
σ−1
σ τ
f
∗)=C fB (τ
f
∗). This gives the first-best transfer and
consumption as given by
τ
f
∗ =
1
2
σ
σ−1
(
z
1−σ
σ −1
)
and C f∗ =
1
2
µ
(
1+ z 1−σσ
) µσ
σ−1
.
Since z
1−σ
σ > 1, the transfer is positive and decreasing in z. Again this transfer does not
affect Y and is independent of µ.
It is natural to expect that lower consumption with no transfers implies lower con-
sumption under full insurance and this is demonstrated in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: First best transfers yield higher aggregate utility under flexible ex-
change rate system: C f∗ ≥C c∗.
PROOF: Rewriting the formulas above for the composite consumptions so that
they can be compared gives
C c∗ =
1
2
z−µ
(
1+ zσ−1) µσσ−1 and C f∗ = 12 z−µ
(
1+ z σ−1σ
) µσ
σ−1
.
Since z
σ−1
σ > zσ−1 for z < 1 and σ> 1 it follows thatC f∗ ≥C c∗. 2
Thus if it were possible to sustain the first-best transfers then again the common
currency area would be sub-optimal. However, we shall be interested in cases where
the common currency regime sustains more insurance than the flexible exchange rate
regime. For some parameter values C fB (0)>C c∗ and in these cases the flexible exchange
rate regime will always dominate as the worst outcome in the flexible exchange rate
regime delivers more welfare than the first-best welfare with a common currency. The
next proposition describes the parameter values such that the common currency can
never be optimal.
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PROPOSITION 3: If z > (1/2)(1+ z)(1−µ) then a flexible exchange rate system is pre-
ferred for any system of transfers between country: C fB (0)>C c∗.
PROOF: The composite consumptionsC fB (0) andC
c∗ are both functions of z,σ and
µ. Therefore let g (z,σ,µ)=C fB (0)/C c∗ denote the ratio of the composite consumptions. It
can be checked that limσ→1 g (z,σ,µ) = 1 and that the function g (z,σ) asymptotes from
above so that limσ→∞ g (z,σ,µ) = 2z/(1+ z)(1−µ). Hence for values of z and µ such that
z > (1/2)(1+ z)(1−µ), g (z,σ,µ)≥ 1 for all values of σ ∈ (1,∞). 2
3.2. Sustainable Assistance
There may be many reasons why the first-best transfers between countries H and
F cannot be achieved. We consider the case where the first-best transfers cannot be
achieved because there is no supra-legal authority to enforce transfer across countries.
To allow for the possibility of transfers we therefore consider that countries interact re-
peatedly over an infinite horizon. Since transfers cannot be legally enforced, countries
can renege on any agreement if they find it in their interest not to make a transfer and
hence any assistance programme has to be designed to be self-enforcing. Thomas and
Worrall (1988) examine self-enforcing wage contracts between an employer an an em-
ployee and a similar approach can be applied here. Thus we presume that countries
make a tacit agreement on a programme of mutual assistance and specify the transfers
to be made by the country with the good productivity shock and to be received by the
country with the bad productivity shock in every possible contingency. We shall assume
that any breach of this tacit agreement results in a breakdown in which no transfers are
made.14,15
To consider such self-enforcing transfers between countries H and F let ht denote
the history of good and bad outcomes for a particular country.16 LetG t denote the good
14A breakdown in which no transfers are made is the worst possible outcome and is sub-game perfect. It
is not however renegotiation-proof. Nevertheless it can be shown that in the current context replacing these
punishmentswith one that are renegotiation-proofwill not change the qualitative or quantitative properties
of the assistance programme.
15There are other possible assumptions one could make about behavior in the breakdown. For example
a stricter punishment could be imposed whereby there is reversion to trade autarky. Alternatively a weaker
punishment would be to assume that following any breakdown in the insurance arrangements there would
be a total breakdown of the currency union itself and a return to a flexible exchange rate regime without
transfers.
16As we have assumed that shocks are perfectly negatively correlated this history has only to be specified
for one arbitrary country and is equivalent to specifying a history of states. We are also assuming that all
other aspects of the economy are unchanging over time.
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productivity shock outcome at date t and B t denote bad productivity shock outcome at
date t . Then ht is a list ofG’s and B ’s where h0 =;. An assistance programme in regime
i ∈ {c, f } then specifies a transfer τiB (ht−1) to made to the country with the bad produc-
tivity shock if the previous history is ht−1 and the transfer to be made by the country
with the good productivity shock τiG (ht−1). The short-term loss to the country with a
good productivity shock of making the required transfer at time t ≥ 1 relative to making
no transfer is
V (C iG (−τiG (ht−1)))−V (C iG (0)).
Likewise the short-term gain at date t ≥ 1 for the country receiving a transfer is
V (C iB (τ
i
B (ht−1)))−V (C iB (0)).
To evaluate future gains and losses we shall assume that countries discount the future by
a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1]. Then the discounted long-term gain from adhering
to the agreed transfers from the next period is (discounted back to period t +1)
E
[ ∞∑
j=0
δ j
{
1
2
[
V (C iG (−τiG (ht+ j )))−V (C iG (0))
]
+ 1
2
[
V (C iB (τ
i
B (ht+ j )))−V (C iB (0))
]}]
.
where the expectation E is taken over all future histories of good and bad productivity
shocks from date t onward, τiG (ht+ j ) is the transfer promised to be made by the country
with the good productivity shock at date t+ j+1 given that the history up to time t was ht
and τiB (ht+ j ) is the transfer to be received by the country with the bad productivity shock
at date t + j +1 given that the history up to time t was ht . Letting V iG (ht ) denote the net
discounted net utility from date t +1 for the country with the good productivity shock,
i.e. where the history is ht+1 = (ht ,G t+1), and V iB (ht ) be the net utility for a country with
a bad productivity shock, i.e. where the history is ht+1 = (ht ,B t+1), we have the recursive
equations
V iG (ht )=V (C iG (−τiG (ht−1)))−V (C iG (0))+δ
[
1
2
V iG (ht ,G
t+1)+ 1
2
V iB (ht ,B
t+1)
]
,
V iB (ht )=V (C iB (τiB (ht+ j )))−V (C iB (0))+δ
[
1
2
V iG (ht ,G
t+1)+ 1
2
V iB (ht ,B
t+1)
]
.
A country in the economic union will make a transfer if the expected discounted risk-
sharing benefits from future transfers exceed the costs of making the current transfer.
Since reneging leads to exclusion, the discounted net utilities must be non-negative at
14
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every history
(12) V iG (ht )≥ 0 and V iB (ht )≥ 0 ∀ ht .
We shall say that an assistance programme is sustainable if equations (12) are satisfied.
In additionwe shall only be interested in programmeswhere the amount received equals
the amount transferred. Thismeans we impose τcG (ht )= τcB (ht ) for all ht under the com-
mon currency regime and τ fG (ht )= z
σ−1
σ τ
f
B (ht ) when the exchange rate is flexible.
0.3 0.6 0.9
z
1.5
2
2.5
Σ
Γ=1.25 Γ=2.5 Γ=5
Figure 1: PARAMETER VALUES FOR WHICH FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATE ALWAYS DOMINATES.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we know that if either first-best transfers or no trans-
fers are sustainable then the flexible exchange rate dominates. However, we shall be
interested in comparing welfare in cases where some insurance is possible (under the
common currency regime) but where first-best transfers are not sustainable (under the
flexible exchange rate regime). For convenience and to obtain closed-form solutions we
shall assume that the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion preferences
V (C )= C
1−γ
1−γ
15
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where γ> 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.17 We also know from Proposition 3
that welfare will only be higher under common currency areas for certain values of z and
σ. Figure 1 illustrates regions of the parameter space for which flexible exchange rates
always dominate because the welfare under flexible exchange rates with no transfers ex-
ceeds the welfare under common currency with first-best transfers. The figure is drawn
for parameter values µ = 0.0518 and three different values of γ. To the right of each line
the flexible exchange rate regime will always dominate for the given value of γ.19
Having established parameter values such that the flexible exchange rate regime al-
ways dominates nomatter what transfers are sustainable the next two subsections there-
fore consider for what parameter values the first-best transfers can be sustained and for
what parameter values no transfers can be sustained. The next sub-section will then
compare welfare in the two regimes.
3.3. Sustainable first best
In this subsection we consider the discount factors for which the first best-best
transfers are sustainable and satisfy equations (12). The first-best transfers are history
independent and provide consumption of C i∗ in both countries. Because the first-best
transfers are independent of history and because a country will only breach when it has
a good productivity shock and is called upon to make a transfer, they are sustainable if
and only if
V (C i∗)−V (C iG (0))+
δ
(1−δ)
{
1
2
[
V (C i∗)−V (C iG (0))
]
+ 1
2
[
V (C i∗)−V (C iB (0))
]}
≥ 0.
Rewriting this equation shows that these transfers are sustainable for discount factors
above a critical level δ
i
where
δ
i ≡ V (C
i
G (0))−V (C i∗)
1
2
[
V (C iG (0))−V (C iB (0))
] .
17A similar analysis also applies in the case where γ = 1 and V (C ) = ln(C ). None of the results hinge on
the constant relative risk aversion formulation but the assumption is useful to illustrate the comparisons
between the two currency regimes.
18With this value of µ, 95% of consumer expenses are made on goods from the rest of the world. Using a
different value of µ changes the scale but not the qualitative properties of this figure.
19If countries are risk-neutral then the the evaluation is simply in terms of expected consumption and the
flexible exchange rate regime always dominates.
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Making use of the constant relative risk aversion specification of preferences the critical
values of the discount factors above which the first-best transfers are sustainable are
independent of µ and are given by
δ
f
(z)= δc (z 1σ )= 2
1−
[
1
2
(
1+ z σ−1σ
)]1−γ
1− z σ−1σ (1−γ)
One can show that for γ≥ 1, δc (z) is a positive and increasing function of z with δc (0)= 0
and limz→1δ
c
(z)= 1. Therefore as z < z1/σ < 1, we get that δ f (z)> δc (z).
3.4. Non-sustainability of assistance
We now consider the case where the two countries H and F cannot sustain any
transfers. We first define the ratio of the marginal utility of the country suffering the bad
productivity shock to the marginal utility of the country experiencing the good produc-
tivity shock when no transfers are made. This is given by
ρi (z)= dV (C
i
B (T ))/dT
dV (C iG (T ))/dT
∣∣∣∣∣
T=0.
With constant relative risk aversion preferences we have
ρ f (z)= ρc (z 1σ )= z−γ σ−1σ
which is again independent ofµ. To find circumstanceswhere it is not possible to sustain
any transfers we need only consider some small and history independent transfers τiG
and τiB . If a country were to breach the agreement it would do so when it has a good
productivity shock and is called upon to make a transfer. Thus the transfers τiG and τ
i
B
are not sustainable if
V (C iG (−τiG ))−V (C iG (0))
+ δ
(1−δ)
{
1
2
[
V (C iG (−τiG ))−V (C iG (0))
]
+ 1
2
[
V (C iB (τ
i
B ))−V (C iB (0))
]}
< 0.
(13)
Approximating the left hand side around τiB = τiG = 0 gives the condition(
1− δ
2
)
+ δ
2
ρi (z)< 0.
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This gives a critical discount factor δi below which no transfers can be sustained in
regime i ∈ {c, f }. Using the assumption of constant relative risk aversion preferences
gives
δ f = δc (z 1σ )= 2
1+ z−γ σ−1σ
.
One readily can show that δc (z) is an increasing function of z with limz→0δc (z)= 0 and
δc (1)= 1. Therefore δc < δ f . This together with the condition of the previous subsection
gives the following result.
PROPOSITION 4: Common currency areas are more likely to sustain an equilibrium
with first best transfers and less likely to sustain an equilibrium with zero transfers than
flexible exchange rate systems.
Figure 2 depicts the critical discount factors that sustain first best and zero transfers
for given values of σ, γ and µ. Below the line δi no transfers can be sustained in regime
i ∈ {c, f }. Above the line δi the first-best transfers can be sustained. For these parameter
values of σ and γ the flexible exchange rate regime can sustain some transfers even for
discount factors low enough that the common currency regime cannot sustain the first-
best, δ f < δc . However, for different values of σ or γ it is easy to show that δ f > δc is
possible.
3.5. Self-enforcing transfers
Self-enforcing transfers will in general be history dependent. However, the results
of Thomas andWorrall (1988) show that the long-run distribution is ergodic. In the case
with just two states transfers will be history independent as soon as both states have
occurred. It easy to find the transfers after both states have been visited. Either the first-
best transfer is sustainable or no transfer is sustainable or the transfer will be set so that
(13) is binding. This is easy to see as if it weren’t binding the transfer could be increased
slightly and welfare could be improved.
Suppose that the parameters are such that the first-best transfer is not sustainable
but that some self-enforcing transfers are sustainable. Self-enforcing transfers are deter-
mined by the following equation
(14) φi (z,τi )≡ V (C
i
B (τ
i
B ))−V (C iB (0))
V (C iG (0))−V (C iG (−τiG ))
= 2−δ
δ
18
CURRENCY AREAS
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
z
0.3
0.6
0.9
∆
∆
c
∆
f
∆
c
∆
f
Figure 2: MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM DISCOUNT FACTORS WHICH SUSTAIN NO TRANSFERS
OR FIRST-BEST TRANSFERS: σ= 1.5 AND γ= 2.
where τi = τiG is the transfer made by the country with the good productivity shock and
where τcB = τcG and τ
f
B = z
σ−1
σ τ
f
G .
PROPOSITION 5: There is a unique value of τi satisfying equation (14) and this value
is strictly increasing in δ.
PROOF: Consider the case of the currency union. Differentiating φc (z,τc ) with
respect to τc shows that
sign
∂φc (z,τc )
∂τc
= sign V
′(C cB (τ
c ))
V ′(C cG (−τc ))
−φc (z,τc ).
By the concavity of V we have for any τc ∈ (0,τc∗),
V (C iB (τ
i
B ))−V (C iB (0))
C cB (τ
c )−C cB (0)
>V ′(C cB (τc ))>V ′(C cG (−τc ))>
V (C iG (0))−V (C iG (−τiG ))
C cG (0)−C cG (−τc )
.
19
PIERREM. PICARD AND TIMWORRALL
In varying τc ,C cG (0)−C cG (−τc )=C cB (τc )−C cB (0) and hence
V ′(C cB (τ
c ))
V ′(C cG (−τc ))
−φc (z,τc )< 0.
Thus φc (z,τc ) is monotonically decreasing in τc and hence there is a unique value of τc
satisfying equation (14). As the right hand side of equation (14) is strictly decreasing in
δ ∈ (0,1) the transfer that can be sustained is strictly increasing in δ. The proof for the
flexible exchange rate case is similar. 2
With constant relative risk aversionpreferences the functionφi (z,τi ) of equation (14)
simplifies considerably so that the transfer τi can be found by solving the involves solv-
ing the equations
(15) φc (z,τc )=φc (z 1σ ,τ f )= (2−δ)
δ
where
φc (z,τ)= z(σ−1)(1−γ)
(
1+ z1−σ (σ−1σ )τ)1−γ−1
1− (1− (σ−1σ )τ)1−γ
With this specification it is clear that since z1/σ < z we have that τ f < τc so that a greater
transfer can be sustained under a currency union that under a flexible exchange rate. In
addition it is possible to show thatφi (z,τi ) is strictly decreasing in z. Thus a larger shock
(smaller value of z) will mean that a larger transfer τi can be sustained. We therefore
have the following result.
PROPOSITION 6: The larger the productivity shock the greater will be the transfer that
is sustained in either regime. The common currency union will sustain a greater transfer
than the flexible exchange rate regime.
As it is not possible to obtain an explicit solution for τi in equation (15) it is difficult
to give analytical results of the effect of the different regimes on welfare. We know from
Propositions 4 and 6 that the common currency regime sustains greater transfers. How-
ever, we also know from Propositions 1 and 2 that the flexible exchange rate system will
generate greater welfare if either no transfers or the first-best transfers can be sustained.
Thus in comparing welfare there are two opposing effects. The common currency area
allows for greater transfers and thus greater sharing of risk and greater welfare. However
it does not allow the inefficiencies in the labor market to be offset by adjustments in the
20
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Figure 3: WELFARE COMPARISONS FOR COMMON CURRENCY AND FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE
RATE REGIMES WITH OPTIMAL SUSTAINABLE TRANSFERS: γ = 2, σ = 1.5, µ = 0.05 AND
z = 0.5.
exchange rate and this tends to lower welfare. However, using equation (15) it is possible
to compute the maximum sustainable transfers for any discount factor and hence com-
pute the expected welfare of each country under flexible exchange rates or a common
currency.
Computations show that either effect can dominate. Thus for some parameter val-
ues a flexible exchange rate regime generates greater welfare and for other parameter
values a common currency does. As the first-best transfers can be sustained under com-
mon currency when less or no transfers can be sustained with flexible exchange rates,
there are many parameter values for which higher welfare can be achieved with a com-
mon currency than with flexible exchange rates. More interesting perhaps are cases
where the common currency cannot sustain first-best transfer, the flexible exchange rate
regime can support some transfers but where the common currency yields higher wel-
fare for some parameter values. Such an example is illustrated in Figure 3. The darker
line plots the welfare under flexible exchange rates against the discount factor. It is ini-
tially horizontal and here no transfers can be sustained but then it rises as some transfers
can be sustained and it is again horizontal for higher discount factors when the first-best
21
PIERREM. PICARD AND TIMWORRALL
transfers can be sustained. The lighter line represents expected utility under common
currency and it has a similar shape (the lower part where no transfers can be sustained is
not illustrated). Following on from Propositions 1 and 2 it is clear that flexible exchange
rates dominate for low discount factors where no transfers can be sustained in either
regime of for high discount factors where first-best transfers can be sustained in either
regime. However, as can be seen the common currency regime does produce higher wel-
fare in an intermediate range of discount factors where neither regime can sustain the
first-best transfers.
4. EXTENSIONS
The model can be extended in a number of directions without changing the sub-
stantive result that considerations of sustainable assistance are important in determin-
ing the relative efficiency of common currency and flexible exchange rate systems. This
section outlines some possible extensions.
4.1. Additional tradable sectors
In the model outlined both the Home and Foreign countries compete in all goods
produced. There may however, be specialized but tradable commodity sectors in each
country. Let Zr be the output of specialized locally produced goods in country r . For
simplicity consider only trade betweenH and F (setµ= 1) and suppose that the constant
elasticity of substitution preferences utility becomes
V (Cr )=V
((∫ 1
0
dr r (ς)
σ−1
σ dς+
∫ 1
0
msr (ξ)
σ−1
σ dξ
) σχ
σ−1
Z
1−χ
2
r Z
1−χ
2
s
)
where (1−χ) is the share of the specialized sectors (which for simplicity we’ve assumed
is evenly distributed between the two countries). Assuming that the two tradable sectors
have constant returns to scale and hire workers who produce at unit productivity, labor
demand is `r = ardr +Zr and gross domestic product Yr = prdr +Zr Prices of the com-
petitively producedmanufacturing goods is the same as before pr = arσ/(σ−1) and the
size of the specialized sectors is
ZH = (1−χ)
2
(YH +εYF )= εZF .
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Then one can show that
(8′) YH = σ
σ−1`H
[
1− (1−χ)
2
1
σ−χ
(
1+ε `F
`H
)]
with a similar expression for YF . Equating demand and supply then gives the following
implicit condition for the exchange rate.
(10′)
(
aH
aF
)1−σ
= ε1−σ
[
(σ−χ)`H − 12 (1−χ)σ(`H +ε`F )
(σ−χ)ε`F − 12 (1−χ)σ(`H +ε`F )
]
.
One can see that for χ = 1, equations (8′) and (10′) reduce to equations (8) and (10) re-
spectively. In the common currency case ε = 1 and either `H or `F is less than one de-
pending on the technology parameters aH and aF . In the flexible exchange rate case
there is full employment so `H = `F = 1. As expected experimentation shows that com-
mon currency areas is more likely to dominate for a large tradable sector χ. Yet the effect
of χ in the examples we computed is not very significant.
4.2. Transactions costs
It is possible to introduce transactions costs into the analysis of the flexible ex-
change rate regime by allowing for a bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread can be taken
fixed percentage θ where
εbid
εask
= 1−θ.
The introduction of a bid-ask spread has two effects that reduce the attractiveness of the
the flexible exchange rate regime. First foreign goods become relative more expensive
reducing the efficiency gains from trade. Secondly, some of the transfer is lost in trans-
action and so insurance is also less effective.
4.3. Alternative stochastic processes
We have assumed that shocks in the two countries H and F are perfectly negatively
correlated. This is mainly for convenience and because it is known that under standard
assumptionswithout insurance this is the case inwhich a flexible exchange rate regime is
most dominant. The assumption of perfect negative correlation and symmetry (together
with the assumption of constant relative risk aversion) also allowed us to derive some
simple analytic formulae for critical discount factors.
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It is possible to generalize the stochastic process and allow for any degree of corre-
lation between shocks and also allow for persistence of shocks within countries. With a
two state income distribution in each of the two countries, there will be four states for
the world economy (with perfect correlation there are just two). This complicates the
analysis slightly. With perfect negative correlation either full, partial or no insurance is
sustainable. With four income states there will typically be degrees of partial insurance
and this needs to be accounted for in the calculations. Nevertheless it is still possible
to calculate analytical results. If there are three income states for each country, high
medium and low, then there are up to nine states for the world economy and analytic
computation becomes difficult. It is possible to compute solutions by numerically by
computing and interpolating the appropriate value function. This is not too computa-
tionally expensive provided the number of states is relatively small. There is however the
further difficulty that with increases in the number of states the time taken to the steady-
state becomes longer, so that an appropriate comparison is not with the steady-state but
with the long-run expected discounted utility taking into account the transition to the
steady-state.
4.4. Labor market imperfections
A restrictive assumption of the analysis is that nominal wages are completely inflex-
ible and this stands in contrast to our assumption that the productmarket is monopolis-
tically competitive. It would be possible to introduce some wage-setting behavior to the
model (see for example Danthine and Hunt 1994) to relax this assumption. Introduce
wage setting would have two opposing effects. First introducing some flexibility into the
labor market would make the currency union less unattractive. Secondly it would make
the punishment of returning to zero transfers less severe and hence reduce the amount
of insurance that could be sustained. The net effect of reducing the labor market imper-
fections in the model is therefore ambiguous and something for further analysis.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the importance of mutual insurance between countries
on the decision to adopt either a common currency or a flexible exchange rate system.
Standard analysis suggests that absent any transactions costs the flexible exchange rate
system will dominate if either there is no insurance or alternatively if there is full in-
surance. However, we have shown that if there are restrictions caused by commitment
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constraints such that only partial insurance is achievable then this result can be reversed
and a common currency can generate higher welfare. The impediment to full insurance
we have assumed is that there is no supra-national authority to enforce insurance pay-
ments across countries and therefore such insurance must be self-enforcing. The impo-
sition of the constraints of self-enforcement mean that sometimes more insurance can
be enforced under a common currency system than a flexible exchange rate system be-
cause the threat of no future insurance if there is a breakdown in transfers is more severe
in the common currency case.
The paper has presented a simple model to illustrate this possibility. There has
been no attempt to calibrate the model as realistic calibration would have to involve a
muchmore sophisticatedmodel of both production and labormarket imperfections and
a more detailed specification of the stochastic structure of shocks. Rather we decided to
illustrate the importance of insurance on the currency union in a model designed to
make currency union a priori less desirable. Thus we assumed that there were no trans-
actions costs in the flexible exchange rate system, there was perfect inflexibility in the
labor market and shocks were perfectly negatively correlated. Despite these assump-
tions it has been shown that there are parameter values where a common currency can
generate greater welfare. The result should be of interest to policy makers as it shows
that any agreement on a system of insurance or fiscal transfers between countries can
have an important impact on the monetary decision to adopt a common currency.
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